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Abstract 
A series of three experiments investigated the effect of information 
about one possible cause of an event on inferences regarding another 
possible cause. Experiment 1 showed that the presence of a second 
possible cause had no effect on the perceived probability that the first 
possible cause influenced the event. However, if the second cause is 
cited as having definitely influenced the event, then the probability 
that the first possible cause influenced the event is reduced. Experiment 2 
showed that the presence of a second possible cause does reduce the 
judged probability that a given cause was present at the time of an 
event. The final experiment revealed that the tendency (found in 
Experiment 1) to discount the involvement of the first cause given the 
involvement of a second cause diminishes when subjects were more highly 
motivated and confronted with their own discounting. These results are 
inconsistent with Kelley's account of discounting and provide some 
support for a proposed explanatory heuristic, the principle of minimal 
causation. Users of this principle analyze a situation until they 
have identified a minimal set of sufficient causes; other possible 
causes are ignored or dismissed. 
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Discounting in Multicausal Attribution: 
The Principle of Minimal Causation 
Attributional research has reliably found that the presence of any 
single cause at the time of a given event is judged to be less likely if 
an additional possible cause is added to the attributional situation. 
This reduction in perceived likelihood, called discounting, has been 
well documented in a variety of settings in social psychological research. 
Whether accounting for their own (Bem, 1967) or another person's behavior 
(Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976; Kelley, 1972a), people 
seem to believe a given possible cause is less likely to be present when 
alternative explanations are available. Related research in developmental 
psychology suggests that this judgment pattern begins to appear somewhere 
between the second and fourth grade (Karniol & Ross, 1976; Schultz, 
Butkowski, Pearce & Shanfield, 1975; Smith, 1975). 
The early interest in this effect focused on its role in inferences 
about the presence of traits and motivational states. Not until Kelley's 
(1972a, 1972b) discussions did attention turn to the source of the 
phenomenon. According to Kelley, people learn through experience that 
each of several causes may be sufficient to produce a given event. If 
that event occurs with only one possible cause present, the attributor 
can be fairly confident about its role in the event. However, the 
presence of alternative causes renders the role of any individual cause 
ambiguous. Thus, Kelley suggests that discounting is due to the uncertainty 
inherent in multicausal situations. 
Although Kelley does identify conditions under which discounting 
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might logically occur, the studies he cites in support of his thesis 
only approximate these conditions. Specifically, his theoretical 
discussions concern judgments of causal influence made when multiple 
causes are known to be present, whereas his supporting experiments ask 
subjects to judge whether or not more than one cause is present. For 
example, subjects might be asked about the likelihood of an actor 
possessing some internal state (e.g., intrinsic motivation) when an 
alternative, external source of the observed behavior was present (an 
external "ulterior" motive in most cases). In general, subjects have 
been less inclined to infer the presence of the internal cause in the 
presence of the external cause. If subjects thought a second cause was 
unlikely to have been present, it is not clear that they were ever judging 
a (Kelley-type) situation in which more than one cause is present. The 
evidence suggests that people may not find multi-causal situations 
ambiguous, but simply unlikely to occur. People who know one cause is 
present seem to believe that the second cause is actually absent. Such 
discounting suggests attributional certainty, not uncertainty. Two 
experiments in multicausal attrib~tion (Kun & Weiner, 1973; Smith, 1975) 
support this view. Subjects who knew that one cause was present 
indicated confidence about the absence of the other cause. Subjects 
seem to be treating a potentially ambiguous multicausal event as an 
unambiguous single causal one. 
At the same time as it raises questions about Kelley's model, such 
evidence suggests a second possible source of the effect. That is, 
people may search for causes until a minimal set of sufficient causes 
has been identified. All other possible causes are then either ignored 
or dismissed. Such a simplifying heuristic could be described as a 
"principle of minimum causation." 
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The strength of these two suggested processes models hinges on the 
conditions under which discounting occurs. Kelley suggests that discounting 
is a function of the number of possible causes present at an event. 
In this view, a subject should rate a cause as more likely to have 
influenced an event if it is the only cause present than if it is 
present along with other possible causes (comparison of single vs. 
multiple causes). According to the principle of minimum causation, it 
is the knowledge that a cause sufficiently explains an event that is 
critical. That is, a cause that is present should be judged as a less 
likely influence when an alternative sufficient cause is known to have 
influenced the event than when the alternative is merely a possible 
contributor. 
In Experiment 1, subjects made attributional judgments under one 
of three conditions. In the first, subjects were given descriptions 
of events with one possible cause (A or B) listed as definitely having 
been present at each event but not necessarily having influenced the 
event (one possible cause). A comparison group read the same event 
descriptions, this time with two possible causes (A and B) cited as 
having been present at each event but not necessarily having influenced 
the event (two possible causes). A third group read the same event 
descriptions with the additional information that one of the causes 
known to be present (A or B) was also known to have contributed to the 
event. The other cause was suggested as a possible cause (one known 
one possible cause). In each condition, subjects judged the likelihood 
that each of the possible causes actually contributed to the event. 
According to Kelley, probability assessments should be highest when 
only one possible cause is present. Uncertainty should increase when 
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other possible causes are available, resulting in lower probability 
assessments for a given cause when presented in the two-possible-causes 
condition than when presented in the one-possible-cause condition. The 
principle of minimum causation implies that subjects should discount the 
influence of possible causes once one sufficient cause is known to have 
contributed to the event. Therefore, lower probabilities of involvement 
should be assigned in the one-known/one-possible-cause condition than 
in the two-possible-causes condition. The two results are not incompati-
ble. Discounting could reflect both strategies of explanation. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
A questionnaire was developed with 24 one-sentence descriptions of 
everyday events (E). Two possible causes (A and B) were derived for 
each event, with the constraint that each cause be a potentially suffi-
cient explanation for the event. Each cause was presented as a fact in 
the situation. Subjects were to assess the probability that each possi-
ble reason actually contributed to the event. Subjects responded under 
one of three conditions. 
One possible cause. For each event, one known fact was described 
which could have contributed to the event. Form A/E listed Cause A as 
a fact; Form B/E listed Cause B. For example, A/E: 
Susan made a $25 donation to a cancer research fund. 
Possible Reason: Someone close to Susan recently died of cancer. 
What is the probability that this fact contributed to the event? 
Or B/E: 
Susan made a $25 donation to a cancer research fund. 
Possible Reason: Susan often gives money to charity. 
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What is the probability that this fact contributed to the event? 
Two possible causes. For each event, two known facts which could 
have contributed to the event were described. Subjects assessed the 
probability that each fact contributed to the event. For example: 
Susan made a $25 donation to a cancer research fund. 
Possible Reason 1: Someone close to Susan recently died of cancer. 
What is the probability that this fact contributed to the event? 
Possible Reason 2: Susan often gives money to charity. 
What is the probability that this fact contributed to the event? 
One known/one possible cause. As in the two-possible-causes form, 
two known facts which could have been causes were described for each 
event. One fact (A or B) was known to have contributed to the event; 
subjects assessed the probability that the other fact was also a cause. 
For example: 
Susan made a $25 donation to a cancer research fund. 
Known Reason: Someone close to Susan recently died of cancer. 
Possible Reason: Susan often gives money to charity. 
What is the probability that this second fact contributed to the 
event? 
Form B/A,E listed Cause A as the known reason, Cause Bas the possible 
reason. Form A/B,E reversed the roles of the two causes. 
Instructions to the subjects in the two-possible-causes condition 
were as follows, with modifications in brackets for the one-known/one-
possible-cause form. Instructions for the one-possible-cause form 
refered to one fact for each event. 
This is a questionnaire about causes of events. In each of 
the questions that follow, an event is described. Listed below 
the event are two facts, each of which is known to have been 
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true when the event occurred. [The first fact (labeled "Known 
Reason") is known to have contributed to the event. The second 
fact (labeled "Possible Reason") may or may not also have been 
involved.] We'd like you to indicate the probability that each 
of these facts [this fact also] contributed to the event's occur-
rence. 
For example: 
(Sample item here.) 
In the space provided write a number from .00 to 1.00 to express 
the probability that each fact [the second fact (Possible Reason)] 
actually contributed to the event •• 00 means that there is no 
chance that the fact contributed to the event; 1.00 indicates that 
the fact definitely contributed to the event. 
Subjects. Subjects were recruited by an advertisement in city 
and university newspapers. A total of 165 people responded to one of 
the five forms: 35 completed one-possible-cause Form A/E; 36 responded 
to one-possible-cause Form B/E; 29 completed om.e-known/one-possible-
cause Form B/A,E; 30 completed one-known/one-possible-cause Form A/B,E; 
35 responded to the two-possible-causes form. 
Results 
Each item of the 24 had two possible causes, each of which was 
presented in all three conditions, affo~ding 48 comparisons between the 
conditions. 
One possible vs. two possible. Mean responses for causes listed 
as the only suggested cause (one possible) were compared with responses 
for the same cause when an alternative pos·sible cause was present (two 
possible causes). There was no systematic difference between the two 
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judgments. In 19 cases, causes received a higher mean probability of 
involvement in the one-possible-cause condition (indicating discounting); 
in 28 cases, causes received higher mean probabilities in the two-possi-
ble-causes condition. The mean difference for the 48 cases was .007 
(with probabilities for two possible causes being very slightly larger). 
Two possible vs. one known/one possible. As predicted by the 
principle of minimum causation, probability assessments were lower in 
the one-known/one-possible-cause condition than in the two-possible-
causes condition. Such discounting occurred on 44 out of the 48 compari-
sons. The mean difference was .120. 
Discussion 
The results indicate that Kelley's conditions are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for discounting. The presence of two rather than one 
possible cause had no influence on subject's assessments of their causal 
role, suggesting that discounting has little to do with the ambiguity 
of multicausal situations. However, congruent with the principle of 
minimum causation, knowledge that a sufficient cause influenced the event 
did lead subjects to discount the involvement of the other cause. Such 
consistent discounting across a wide variety of causes and events (albeit 
all in one format) suggests that this pattern of response may represent 
a widely applied heuristic in explanation. 
The similarity of responses in the one-possible-cause and two-
possible-causes conditions here stands in sharp contrast to the systematic 
differences observed in previous studies of discounting. Whereas 
previous research asked subjects about the probability of causes being 
present, we have argued that a judgment of the likelihood of causal 
influence is a more appropriate assessment of the proposed processes. 
We would attribute our contrasting results to this shift in response. 
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An alternative explanation is that the difference between the present 
and previous results is due to some artifact of experimental format. 
Perhaps the causes and events used in this research differed systemati-
cally from those used previously. Having subjects rate so many different 
cause-effect relationships may have influenced the decision strategies 
they used. To evaluate these hypotheses, it is important to observe 
judgment patterns on these items under the conditions used in previous 
discounting work. Experiment 2 was planned as such a replication. 
The same causes and events were used in a pair of conditions that 
required subjects to make likelihood judgments for causal presence 
rather than for the likelihood of causal influence. One group of 
subjects read the event statements and judged the likelihood that a given 
cause was present. A second group judged the likelihood that the same 
cause was present, knowing that a second cause was definitely present 
at the event. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
The questionnaire for Experiment 2 was composed of the 24 cause-
event items used in Experiment 1. For each item, subjects were to assess 
the probability that a possible cause was present at the event. Subjects 
made judgments under one of two conditions. 
One possibly present. One possible cause was listed for each event. 
Form A/E suggested Cause A as a possible cause of E; Form B/E suggested 
Cause B. For example, A/E: 
Ellen lost her match in the tennis tournament. 
Her opponent had an especially good serve. 
or B/E: 
Ellen lost her match in the tennis tournament. 
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She was a little weak from a recent bout with the flu. 
One known/one possibly present. Two possible causes (A and B) were 
listed for each event. In this case, however, one cause (A or B) was 
stated as a fact in the sitution; the alternative cause was suggested 
as a possible cause. For example: 
Ellen lost her match in the tennis tournament. Her opponent had 
an especially good serve. 
She was a little weak from a recent bout with the flu. 
Form B/A,E listed Cause A as known, Cause Bas possible; Form A/B,E 
reversed the roles of the two causes. 
Instructions on all forms were as follows (with appropriate modifi-
cations in brackets): 
This is a questionnaire about the causes of events. In each 
of the questions that follow, an event is described, with a [two] 
possible cause[s] listed below. We'd like you to indicate the 
probability that the [each] listed cause was present when the event 
occurred. 
For example: 
(Sample item here) 
In each space provided write a number from .00 to 1.00 to express 
the probability that the [each] suggested cause was present when 
the event occurred; .00 means that there is no chance that the cause 
was present at the event; 1.00 indicates that the cause was definitely 
present when the event occurred. 
Subjects. Subjects were recruited as before. A total of 162 people 
participated, each completing one of the questionnaire forms: 39 sub-
jects responded to one-possibly-present Form B/E, 35 to one-possibly-
present Form A/E; each of two groups of 44 subjects completed one of 
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the one-known/one-possibly-present forms. 
Results 
As before, two possible causes for each of 24 events generated 48 
possible comparisons between conditions. Discounting, reflected by a 
lower mean probability of presence when a second cause was known to have 
been present, occurred on 37 out of the 48 items. The mean difference 
was .09. 
Discussion 
Considered together, Experiments 1 and 2 make considerable progress 
in clarifying the nature of the discounting effect. Experiment 2, using 
the response of previous experiments (probability of presence) produced 
the type of discounting Kelley used in support of his argument. Thus, 
there seems to be nothing special about the stimuli used in this 
present research. Under these circumstances, discounting could have 
more than one interpretation. Kelley's position might account for the 
data if lowered probabilities are interpreted as reflecting the ambiguity 
of multicausal attribution. Alternatively, subjects may be using a 
principle of minimal causation. By definition, an event will occur once 
a sufficient cause is present. Additional causes are unnecessary for 
the event to occur and, thus, may be seen as less likely to have been 
present. 
Experiment 1 is much more diagnostic for discriminating the possible 
sources of discounting. Contrary to Kelley's argument, discounting seems 
to be unaffected by the mere presence of alternative causes. Rather, 
it is the knowledge that one cause contributed to an event which leads 
subjects to discount the likelihood that a second cause was also involved. 
Such a pattern suggests judgment according to a principle of minimum 
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causation. Causes unnecessary to an event are seen as unlikely to have 
influenced that event. 
The existence of a sufficient cause carries no logical implication 
regarding the role of other causes. However, other aspects of the cause-
effect relationship may lead to logical inferences about the relative 
influences of possible causes for a given event. For example, two causes 
may be known to interact so as to produce an effect different from the 
main effects of each of those two causes. One such interaction pattern, 
particularly appropriate when there are two contributory causes (as 
there were in these examples), is Kelley's (1972b) graded effects schema: 
while the involvement of either cause is sufficient to produce the event, 
the involvement of both will produce the event with greater intensity. 
In this schema, given that an event has occurred (at a particular level 
of intensity), information about the involvement of one cause may change 
one's judgments regarding the involvement of another cause. Consider 
the sample item given earlier in which Susan gave $25 to a cancer fund. 
If $25 is not a lot of money for Susan, then giving that amount would 
suggest the involvement of only one of the two possible causes, being 
charitable or having a friend who died of cancer. According to the 
schema, if both causes were involved, she would have given more than $25. 
In this way, the role of a second cause may be determined once the strength 
of an event and first cause are defined. 
Given these considerations, the propriety of a minimal causal 
strategy is difficult to evaluate. Whereas conditions can be defined 
in which minimum causal reasoning would be inappropriate, such reasoning 
may be logically sound in a graded effects context. Thus, the appropriateness 
of the heuristic is context dependent and hard to evaluate without a model 
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of the underlying causal process in a particular context. 
Experiment 3 was designed to identify subjects' own beliefs about 
appropriate causal reasoning. Subjects were asked to make both multiple-
possible and multiple-known judgments. We hoped that a within-subject 
design in which both judgments were simultaneously available would prompt 
subjects to think more deeply about the interrelationships between causes 
and events. Within-subject designs have been found to reduce a number 
of judgmental biases originally observed in experiments using between-
subject designs (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1978). Thoughtful 
judgment was further encouraged by instructions emphasizing judgmental 
accuracy. 
Since causes and effects are the same as those used previously, 
causal interactions (as in the graded effects schema) should be con-
stant across experiments. Thus, subjects who are responding to 
perceived graded effects relationships between the causes and events 
should persist in discounting under these conditions. The principle 
of minimal causation makes no necessary predictions for this experi-
ment, although its conditions might be expected to encourage some 
subjects to use more complex (multicausal) ~odels. 
Method 
The first 15 events and their causes from the questionnaire developed 
for Experiments 1 and 2 were selected for use in Experiment 3. Each 
item described an event and two possible reasons known to have been 
present at the event. Subjects were asked to assess the probability 
that each of the two causes known to have been present contributed to 
the event. They were then told that the second possible reason definitely 
contributed to the event and were asked for the probability that the 
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first reason also contributed to the event. Their first two judgments 
corresponded to those made by subjects in the two-possible-causes condi-
tion of Experiment 1; their final judgment corresponded to that made by 
subjects in the one-known/one-possible-cause condition of Experiment 1. 
A sample item: 
Tom sold his downhill skis and boots. 
I. Possible Reason 1: Downhill skiing was getting too crowded for 
him to enj oy. 
What is the probability that this fact contributed to this event? 
II. Possible Reason 2: He needed money for tuition. 
What is the probability that this fact contributed to this event? 
III. You learn that the fact that Tom needed money for tuition 
definitely contributed to this event. 
What is the probability that the fact that downhill skiing was 
getting too crowded for him to enjoy also contributed to this event? 
Form A/Bused Cause A as Possible Reason 1, Cause Bas Possible Reason 2. 
Form B/A reversed the roles of the two causes. In each case, Question I 
asked subjects to judge the probability that Possible Reason 1 contributed 
to the event when Reason 2 was also possible; Question II was identical 
to Question I with the roles of Reasons 1 and 2 reversed; and Question III 
asked the probability that Possible Reason 1 contributed to the event 
when Reason 2 was known to have contributed. A lower probability in III 
than in I represents discounting. 
Instructions to the subjects were as follows: 
This is a questionnaire about the causes of events. We'd 
like you to help us find the most accurate estimate of the relation-
ships between events and their possible causes. In each of the 
questions that follow, a different event is described. Listed 
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below the event are facts which are known to have been true when 
the event occurred. Your task throughout the questionnaire is to 
estimate the probability that each of these facts was a cause 
of the event. In the space provided, write a number from .00 to 
1.00 to express the probability that each fact actually contributed 
to the event described; .00 means that there is no chance that 
the fact contributed to the event; 1. 00 indicates that the fact 
definitely contributed to the event. Remember that your goal 
is to give the most accurate estimate for each item. 
Subjects. As before, subjects were solicited by newspaper adver-
tisement; 25 completed Form A/B, and 28 completed Form B/A. 
Results 
Discounting remained a common, but no longer dominant, strategy. 
Over all subjects and items, discounting occurred (I> III) 37.9% of the 
time, but III> I judgments were equally common (33.0%). I= III 
judgments represented 29.1% of the items. The mean I> III difference 
was .296, the mean III< I difference .283, and the mean overall difference 
was .010 in the direction of discounting. 
The extent of discounting for items under these experimental 
conditions bore little relationship to the extent of the discounting in 
Experiment 1. A correlation over items between discounting in the two 
experiments was not significant(.£= .19). 
Discussion 
If discounting in Experiment 1 was due to a preponderance of 
situations in which graded effects schemata applied among our items, one 
would expect the same high level of discounting in Experiment 3. Simi-
larly, if discounting was due to the nature of the items, there should 
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be some relationship between the relative extent of discounting for 
each item in the two experiments. Neither effect was observed. Either 
subjects were not relying on graded effects schemata in Experiment 1 or 
the conditions of Experiment 3 caused them to change their minds about 
those causal relations. Such a change could be interpreted as indicating 
that when we are not forced to think very hard, we tend to see events 
as fitting graded effects schemata in order to justify using the minimal 
causal principle. Of course, if people aren't working too hard, they 
might just use the principle and not worry about elaborate justifications. 
Subjects' judgments in Experiment 3 raise similar questions about 
the role of the principle of minimal causation. One possible position 
is that, while it was a potent contributor to judgments in Experiment 1, 
the changed instructions and opportunity to compare judgments in Experi-
ment 3 encouraged the use of other strategies for multicausal attribution. 
A second possible position is that the use of the principle is just as 
prevalent. That is, in both experiments, subjects were equally prone 
to search for explanations for an event until a minimal set of sufficient 
causes has been identified (and to view additional possible causes as 
superfluous). However, the conditions of Experiment 3 led subjects to 
invoke different, perhaps more complex, schemata as describing the inter-
relation between causes and events. These schemata required a larger 
set of causes in order to constitute the minimal set. Subjects may 
have used graded effects schemata (which encourage discounting) less 
and multiple sufficient schemata (consistent with I= II) more. 
The contrast between Experiments 1 and 3 suggests that explanatory 
strategies may vary with motivation and context. At one extreme, people 
may act like scientists checking out all possible contributing causes 
in order to maximize their power to predict and control events. At the 
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other, given that a desire to explain events is evoked at all, people 
may be content simply to make sense out of the environment. Reliance 
on the principle of minimal causation would suit this latter aim quite 
well. Given the ambiguity inherent in many causal relationships, people 
may feel quite comfortable about adopting the simplest interpretation 
congruent with their observations. Indeed, the very ambiguity of many 
events with multiple causes would make it unlikely that any derivation 
of the principle of minimal causation would be clearly refuted by 
subsequent experience. In order to make a clearer statement about the 
prevalence and propriety of using that principle, some control or 
independent assessment of people's perceptions of the causal schemata 
underlying the judged situations is needed. 
It is clear, though, that uncritical use of the principle of 
minimal causation can lead to trouble. The order in which information 
is received about an event is often happenstance, meaning that chance 
may determine which possible cause is positively implicated first and 
which is discounted. Once one cause is known to have been involved, 
adherents to the principle of minimal causation should become uninter-
ested in information regarding other causes. Such apathy could be 
particularly damaging when the first evidence complicating a cause is 
unreliable or erroneous. In such cases, the true cause may never be 
evaluated because the question was closed prematurely. 
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